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Abstract
Recent breakthroughs in the field of deep learning have led to advancements in a
broad spectrum of tasks in computer vision, audio processing, natural language
processing and other areas. In most instances where these tasks are deployed in
real-world scenarios, the models used in them have been shown to be susceptible
to adversarial attacks, making it imperative for us to address the challenge of
their adversarial robustness. Existing techniques for adversarial robustness fall
into three broad categories: defensive distillation techniques, adversarial training
techniques, and randomized or non-deterministic model based techniques. In this
paper, we propose a novel neural network paradigm that falls under the category
of randomized models for adversarial robustness, but differs from all existing
techniques under this category in that it models each parameter of the network as
a statistical distribution with learnable parameters. We show experimentally that
this framework is highly robust to a variety of white-box and black-box adversarial
attacks, while preserving the task-specific performance of the traditional neural
network model.
Preprint. Under review.
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1 Introduction
Neural systems are currently used in a broad spectrum of complex classification tasks, such as object
recognition, speech processing, text generation etc. Many are deployed in large-scale tasks that
are critical to human well-being and safety, such as biometric access points, medical assessments
and self-driving cars. The systems themselves, however, are currently largely unprotected against
malicious adversarial attacks – the presentation of inputs that have been purposely crafted to make
the systems behave in incorrect ways [1] (Figure.1). Motivated largely by the desire to expose these
vulnerabilities, a significant body of scientific literature has arisen in recent times on increasingly
sophisticated techniques to generate adversarial instances – inputs that may fool machine learning
systems [1, 2, 3].
With the increasing ubiquity of deep learning systems in the real world, the task of designing network
architectures and learning paradigms that are robust to adversarial attacks is now recognized to be of
paramount importance, and not surprisingly many solution approaches have been proposed in the
literature [4, 5, 6]. Adversarial training attempts to adjust classifier decision boundaries away from
adversarial instances by including the latter in the training data [7]. Distillation-based methods “distil”
the trained networks into secondary networks to minimize their sensitivity to adversarial modifications
of the input [8, 9]. Projection [10] and reconstruction methods [4] attempt to project down (and
possibly reconstruct) inputs prior to feeding them to the system, in order to eliminate adversarial
modifications. Randomization-based methods add noise or other random transformations [11] to
the input to mask out adversarial modifications [12]. All of these methods assume the classification
network itself to be deterministic.
In this paper, we propose a novel and alternate route to adversarial robustness. In our approach the
parameters of the network are themselves stochastic, having a statistical distribution with learnable
parameters. Inference on the network too is stochastic. The premise behind our model is that the
randomness in the model confounds the ability of the adversary to determine the minimal change of
the input required to fool it. Randomness during inference also increases the probability of avoiding
the increased-variance adversarial inputs that result.
We use a modified version of the Stochastic Delta Rule (SDR)[13] to implement our stochastic models,
employing a novel reparameterization trick to learn the distributions for the network parameters.
We show experimentally that this framework does indeed provide protection against a variety of
adversarial attacks in which other defences fail, while preserving the task-specific performance of the
traditional neural network model.
Figure 1: Examples of adversarial attaks on a variety of application domains. From left to right:
Adversarial physical-world attack on stop signs [14], face-recognition systems [15], and medical
diagnosis systems [16]. The adversarilly designed patches on the stop sign, spectacles on the face
and noise in the x-ray all cause them to be misrecognized.
2 Attacks: The Adversarial Threat Model
We briefly discuss existing approaches to generate adversarial samples, to set the background for the
discussion of current state-of-the-art defense techniques and our own proposal.
The goal of the adversary is generally to generate examples that are perceptually indistinguishable
from authentic (“clean”) inputs, but are incorrectly classified by the model. The adversary may either
choose to generate inputs that produce a specific (bogus) output from the classifier (targeted attack),
or modify a clean input such that it is classified as not belonging to its true class, without explicitly
considering what it may be classified as instead (untargeted attack). We primarily consider the latter
in this paper, although the proposed approach should generalize to targeted attacks as well.
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Adversarial examples can be generated in either a white-box or a black-box setting. In the white-box
scenario, the adversary has full access to the target model’s architecture and gradients. Adversarial
inputs are generally obtained by minimally perturbing clean inputs such that they now produce
bogus outputs [1]. The perturbations are computed using variations of gradient descent. After a
forward pass, gradients of an adversary-defined objective are back-propagated onto the clean input,
revealing the adversarial perturbations that would confuse the model once added to it. Adversarial
perturbations may be generated either by taking a single step along the gradient (one-step methods)
[1] or taking steps iteratively until some stopping criterion is met (iterative methods) [7]. On the
other hand, black-box adversarial attacks craft adversarial examples without any internal knowledge
of the target network, which makes them much more applicable in the real-world setting. Here the
general approach is to probe the classifier with inputs to obtain input-output pairs. These are used to
learn how to generate adversarial samples [17].
In our experiments, we choose to evaluate model robustness by classification accuracy under two
white-box attacks, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and DeepFool Attack, and one black-box
attack named LocalSearch, which we briefly review below.
2.1 White-box one-step attack example: Fast Gradient Sign Method
Define the loss L(X, ytarget) as a function of input X and its target label ytarget, which regular,
non-adversarial training tries to minimize. To produce adversarial instances the adversary instead
increases L(X, ytarget), tweaking the input such that the model is less likely to classify it correctly.
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) proposed in [1] generates adversarial examples by taking a
single step:
Xadv = X +  ∗ sign(∇XL(X, ytarget))
where the size of the perturbation  is often subject to some restrictions [7]. A common implementation
of the FGSM attack is to gradually increase the magnitude of  until the input is misclassified. Its
iterative extension named basic iterative method has the following update rule [18]:
Xadv0 = X, X
adv
N+1 = ClipX,
{
XadvN + α ∗ sign(∇XL(XadvN , ytarget))
}
where α regulates the size of the update on each step and the total size of perturbation is capped at 
using ClipX, 1.
2.2 White-box iterative attack example: DeepFool
The DeepFool attack is an iterative attack similar to the basic iterative method but also takes into
account the `2-norm of the gradients when computing the update rule. The original paper suggests
that the proposed method generates adversarial perturbations which are hardly perceptible, while
the fast gradient sign method outputs a perturbation image with higher norm [2]. Such patterns are
observed on both the MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset using the state-of-the-art architectures.
Algorithm 1: DeepFool Algorithm
Result: DeepFool Algorithm(binary case)
1 Initialize: x0 ← x, i← 0
2 while sign(f(xi)) = sign(f(x0)) do
3 ri ← f(xi)||∇f(xi)||22∇f(xi)
4 xi+1 ← xi + ri
5 i← i+ 1
6 end
2.3 Black-box iterative attack example: LocalSearch
In the case of black-box attacks, the adversaries do not have access to model architecture and have no
internal knowledge of the target network. These kinds of methods treat the network as an oracle and
1Here we borrow the notation from [7]. ClipX,(A) clips A element-wise such that Ai,j ∈ [Xi,j − ,Xi,j +
].
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only assume that the output of the network can be observed on the probed inputs. The LocalSearch
attack is accomplished by carefully constructing a small set of pixels to perturb by using the idea of
greedy local search [3]. This is an extension of a simple adversarial attack, which randomly selects
a single pixel and applies a strong perturbation to it in order to misclassify the input image. The
LocalSearch attack is also an iterative procedure, where in each round a local neighborhood is used to
refine the current image. This process minimizes the probability of assigning high confidence scores
to the true class label, by the network. This approach identifies pixels with high saliency scores but
without explicitly using any gradient information [3].
3 Defense: Methods Against Adversaries
On the defenders’ side, proposed measures against adversarial attacks include input validation and
preprocessing, adversarial training, defensive distillation and architecture modifications. In the
paragraphs below, we briefly review these methods and discuss how randomized training/models
such as stochastic delta rule could increase model robustness against adversaries.
3.1 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training increases model robustness by providing adversarial examples to the model
during training. The standard practice is to generate adversarial examples from a subset of the
incoming batch of clean inputs dynamically. The model is then trained on the mixed batch of clean
and adversarial inputs. However in order to do this, a specific method for generating adversarial
examples must be assumed, preventing adversarial training from being adaptive to different attack
methods. For example, [7] showed that models adversarially trained using one-step methods are
fooled easily by adversarial examples generated using iterative methods; models adversarially trained
using a fixed  could even fail to generalize to adversarial examples created using different  values.
3.2 Defensive Distillation
Distillation was originally proposed in the context of model compression, aiming to transfer learned
knowledge from larger, more complex models to more compact and computationally efficient models
[8]. Defensive distillation was first proposed by [9] as a training regime to increase model robustness
against adversaries. The goal of defensive distillation is not as much transfer learning (for which
distillation was originally proposed), but rather to train models to have smoother gradient surfaces
with respect to the input – such that small steps in the input space do not change the model’s output
significantly.
While smoothing out the gradients that adversaries usually use to create adversarial examples is
effective in the setting described by the original paper, [19] pointed out that the attack assumed by
[9] (Papernot’s attack) could be oblivious to potentially stronger attacks. In addition, models trained
with defensive distillation possess no advantage against a modified version of Papernot’s attack
when compared to regularly trained models. Works such as [20] investigate the effect of network
compression solely for the purpose of transferring model knowledge, but discovers the effect of
robustness against adversaries as a side product.
3.3 Randomized Methods & Models
Randomized training methods seek to improve the robustness of deep models by introducing ran-
domness, irrespective of benign or adversarial samples, during the training process. For example,
[12] introduces a random resizing layer and/or zero-padding layer prior to the regular architectures
of CNNs. Through experimental evaluation, the authors discovered that this method is particularly
effective against iterative attacks, while other methods introduced above are better at handling single-
step attacks. A combination of both methods, as the authors argue, achieve best performance against
arbitrary adversaries.
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4 Adversarial robustness through stochastic parameters
Once trained, traditional neural networks have fixed parameters during inference. This permits
the adversary to obtain consistent responses from the system, as well as consistent gradient values
required to compute perturbations.
In our approach the network parameters are themselves stochastic, drawn from a distribution. Each
parameter wj in the network (which we assume without loss of generality to be a vector) has its own
distribution P (wj ; θj) with parameter θj . When performing inference, the parameter value wj is
drawn from its distribution, i.e. wj ∼ P (wj ; θj). The process of training the network comprises
learning the parameters of the the distributions θj , rather than the parameters wj themselves.
As a consequence of the stochasticity of the network, the gradients computed by an adversary (for
the purpose of generating adversarial samples) will actually be stochastic, and may not generalize
to other runs inference when the drawn parameter values are different. While it may seem that this
effect should have little influence and average out in expectation, particularly for black-box attacks,
our experiments reveal that it is in fact sufficient to greatly decrease the efficacy of the adversary.
For our solution we use variants of the Stochastic Delta Rule [13] to build our network. We describe
these below. We provide the specifics of the original SDR training routine (SDR-Decay), along with
our proposed fine-grained variant of SDR (SDR-Learnable). Along this trajectory, we will raise the
issue of practical implementation concerns, the connection between SDR and regularization, and
a qualitative explanation of feasibility of a SDR-augmented training routine in improving model
generalizability and robustness against adversaries.
4.1 The Stochastic Delta Rule
First introduced in [13], SDR is revisited under the deep learning setting in [21]. During the forward
pass of an SDR-equipped model, parameters wj are not regarded as fixed values, but are rather
random variables sampled from an arbitrary distribution P (wj ; θj) specified by parameters θj . The
choice of such distribution is arbitrary. For the purpose of our experiments, we assume that model
parameters wj follow a normal distribution, i.e. P (wj ; θj) = N(µj ,Σj), and are independent of
each other. The parameters µj and Σj must be learned for each wj .
In the discussions below on training these parameters, we will drop the subscript j for brevity. Given
a (minibatch of) training input(s) (X, y) with features X and labels y, at training iteration t, a model
with the SDR training routine samples model parameters w(t) ∼ N(µ(t),Σ(t)), fits the current batch
with respect to the sampled parameters, and performs the following updates:
µ(t+1) ← µ(t) − α∇wL(X, y,w(t))
Σ(t+1) ← Σ(t) + β|∇wL(X, y,w(t))| (1)
where α, β are step sizes for the mean and variance respectively, and, as before, L() is a loss function.
On one hand, it can be readily observed that with β = 0 and zero-intialization of the covariance
matrix, only the mean parameters are updated, and we recover the usual training routine without SDR.
On the other hand, [21] states that if parameters are sampled from a binomial distribution with mean
Dp and variance Dp(1− p), SDR could be regarded as a special case of dropout with probability p,
only in this case the variance is not updated with respect to information gathered from the gradients.
4.2 SDR Update with Scheduled Variance Decay
We first consider the SDR proposed by [21] which we formally present in algorithm 2. While
updating model weights, the original SDR does not backpropagate gradients onto the parameter
variances. Instead, the parameter variances are updated using the size of their associated means’
gradients, |∇w∂L(X, y,w)| (see Equation 1). As explained by [21] in the original paper, the intuition
behind this update rule is that a larger gradient on the parameter mean would motivate expansion of
the random node’s distribution to explore potentially better weight values. Besides this update by
gradient, the original SDR anneals the parameter variances by ζ to ensure asymptotically decaying
variances (see Algorithm 2 below). As training progresses, variances are shrunk so as to sample
progressively concentrated parameters around the mean, for which reason we term this original
SDR as SDR-Decay. In our implementation, we further introduce the decay schedule, τ , to avoid
5
over shrinkage and allow sufficient exploration of our model within the parameter space. At test
time, under original the SDR, one would compute the forward pass directly with parameter means.
However, in our case where SDR is applied to adversarial defense, doing so would defeat the purpose
of generating stochastic gradients that mislead the adversary; thus we compute the forward pass of
our model using weights sampled from the learned parameter distributions, as done during training.
Algorithm 2: SDR-Decay. The algorithm applies to every parameter in the network.
1 input dataset {(Xi, yi)}ni=1, decay schedule τ , decay rate ζ ∈ (0, 1], batch size B
2 Initialize model parameters µ(0,0),Σ(0,0)
3 num-batches← n//B
4 for e = 1, 2, · · · until convergence:
5 for b = 1, 2, · · · , num-batches
6 Sample batch parameter weights w ∼ N(µ,Σ)
7 Compute forward pass of network with respect to w
8 Perform SDR parameter updates with respect to equations 1
9 If b%τ = 0: Σ← ζΣ
10 End for
11 End for
4.3 SDR-Learnable
Algorithm 2 updates both parameter means and variances with∇w∂L(X, y,w), requiring backward
pass on only one set of parameters w for each batch. We can, however, let both means and variances
be fully learnable and have them updated with ∇w∂L(X, y,w) and ∇Σ∂L(X, y,w) respectively.
The resulting algorithm, termed SDR-Learnable, produces a more realistic learning paradigm that
approximates the behavior of variable parameters with higher fidelity. The drawback of such approach,
of course, is doubling the computation required to compute the gradients. At test time, we sample
parameters from learned means and variances, and perform inference on input data with sampled
parameters.
It is worth noting that with this formulation of the update rule, we require the loss function to be
differentiable with respect to the parameters µ and Σ. However, the loss value is computed based
on sampled realizations of many random variables along the forward pass. The sampling operation
is not explicitly differentaible with respect to distribution parameters. In order to circumvent this
issue, we use the reparametrization trick, as illustrated in figure 2, to make the network capable of
backpropagating through random nodes. This technique essentially transfers the non-deterministic
nature of the weight to another source of randomness, which then allows the randomly generated
weights to be differentiable with respect to its parameters.
Figure 2: Reparameterization trick of SDR-Learnable update
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In section 4.3.2, we show that the variance of the parameter distributions will shrink as the network is
trained. Smaller variances result in less randomness in the forward pass, and as a result of this, the
network does not exhibit consistent robustness to adversarial attacks. Furthermore, larger variances
introduce a large amount of non-determinism in the forward pass. While this yields higher robustness,
the overall task performance accuracy of the network diminishes.
In order to address this issue, we further modified the SDR architecture to use variance thresholds
to ensure all parameter distributions’ variances fall within a specified range during training. After
performing each optimization step, we iterate through all parameters in the network and update them
to fall within the desired range as shown in Algorithm 3 below.
Algorithm 3: Variance Threshold
1 for µ, σ in network parameters:
2 if σ > max var:
3 σ = max var
4 else if σ < min var:
5 σ = min var
6 End for
In order to find a trade-off between task-specific performance and adversarial robustness, we employed
a training schedule to incrementally increase the variance of the parameter distributions. The minimum
and maximum variances were initialized to 0.0 and 1.0 respectively. After every epoch of training, we
evaluate the task-specific performance of the model on the test dataset. If the test performance begins
to plateau, we increase both the minimum and maximum variances by 0.05. This update occurs at
most once every five epochs of training. As we increase the variance, the test accuracy decreases
initially. After fixing the variance thresholds, the test accuracy improves again on the subsequent
training iterations. Increasing the minimum variance allows us to improve the non-determinsm, which
directly impacts the network’s robustness to adversarial examples. By controlling the maximum
variance, we ensure that the network is still capable of achieving high task-specific performance.
Using this training schedule, we are able to train a network with high variance that performs well on
the clean data, and is robust to adversarial attack.
4.3.1 SDR-Learnable in Adversarial Learning
The inference procedure of SDR-Learnable produces variable predictions with the same input, which
motivates us to investigate its robustness against adversarial samples. Our qualitative motivation for
this hypothesis is as follows: adversarial attacks are designed to lead models to misclassify, while
inducing no human-recognizable changes to inputs. The adversarially modified and original clean
inputs must be very similar. To account for such perturbations, the decision boundaries of a model
must not only cater to the specific data points provided in the training data, but also to a vicinity of
these points in the sample space.
The variable treatment of parameters in SDR-Learnable is a step towards defensive strategies in two
aspects: (1). the most effective gradient attack direction is computed with respect to one sampled
parameter instance, and is less effective for another; (2) instead of fitting data at localized points,
models with variable parameters create a decision region subject to the parameter distribution, hence
allowing more robust prediction against adversarial samples.
4.3.2 SDR-Learnable in Generalization
The description of decision regions, rather than spiky predictions, of SDR-Learnable naturally leads
us to investigate its relationship to model generalization. In particular, we are interested in whether the
inclusion of variable model parameters improves out-of-sample performance, and how do variances
behave as training progresses. We present the following result as a first step towards the analysis.
LetX ∈ RN×D and y ∈ RN be fixed, and w ∈ RD be a random vector with E[w] = µ, Cov[w] = Σ,
then the risk of a linear regression model yˆ = Xw takes the form
Ew
[‖y −Xw‖2] = ‖y −Xµ‖2 + ‖XΣ1/2‖2 (2)
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With simple algebra of expectation, we observe that
Ew
[‖y −Xw‖2] = ||y||2 − 2yTXEw[w] + N∑
i=1
Ew[(XTi w)2] (3)
= ||y||2 − 2yTXEw[w] +
N∑
i=1
(
Var[XTi w] + (X
T
i Ew[w])2
)
(4)
= ||y||2 − 2yTXµ+
N∑
i=1
(X2i µ)
2 +
N∑
i=1
XTi ΣXi (5)
= ||y −Xµ||2 + ||XΣ1/2||2. (6)
It can be readily observed that under the stylized linear regression model, SDR-Learnable is
equivalent to regularizing parameter variances Σ with penalty matrix X . In neural network training,
we expect that the the Frobenius norm of Σ to decay progressively, hence leading to more concentrated
parameter samples. Notice that the decay step Σ ← ζΣ in SDR-Decay is a step towards artificial
control of the magnitude of parameter variances, mimicking the behavior of SDR-Learnable.
It is worth noting that the parameter distribution does not necessarily lead to better generalization.
Improved performance may be obtained by averaging the outcomes of multiple inferences, however
this comes at the cost of adversarial robustness. Consequently we only perform a single pass of
inference on any sample.
5 Experiments & Results
We experimentally evaluate the efficacy of the proposed SDR-Learnable in model generalization and
robustness against adversarial samples on the MNIST [22] dataset, using the FoolBox toolkit [23]
for adversarial samples. To compare performance, we evaluate three baseline models in addition to
SDR-Learnable: a standard 3-layer MLP, a 3-layer SDR MLP, and a 3-layer MLP with DropConnect
(p = 0.2) [24]. Dropconnect is a generalization of dropout [25], which introduces non-determinism
in the network by randomly dropping network connections. This non-determinism results in an
improvement in adversarial robustness. The SDR-Learnable model used is a 3-layer MLP with
learnable parameter distributions for weights and biases. All models had an input layer of size 784,
followed by three hidden layers of size 100 and a final layer with 10 output neurons, representing the
class probabilities. The ReLU activation was used on all layers except the output layer which used
the Softmax activation. To train all models, we used the Cross-Entropy Loss function.
Experimental evaluation was restricted to these simple models as gradient-based white-box attacks
are significantly harder to defend against in this setting; larger and more complex models’ gradients
w.r.t the input are more dificult to estimate, adversely affecting the generated adversarial sample.
Furthermore, black-box attacks will be able to estimate a simple models’ decision boundaries to a
higher degree of accuracy, resulting in more challenging adversarial inputs.
The models were trained using the standard train and test split on the MNIST dataset[22], the test-set
results are reported in Table.1. The classification accuracy on the regular test-set was consistent
across all models, with SDR-Learnable achieving an overall accuracy of 97.87%, outperformining
the MLP and SDR baselines. It shows superior robustness against adversarial samples. Particularly in
the case of the one-step FGSM attack, the SDR-Learnable model achieves a classification accuracy
that is comparable to the classification accuracy on the uncontaminated dataset.
Vanilla MLP SDR-decay MLP Learnable SDR MLP DropConnect
Regular Samples 97.59% 97.55% 97.87% 97.95%
FGSM Attack 0% 4.61% 94.86% 45.9%
DeepFool Attack 0% 3.87% 78.42% 45.48%
LocalSearch Attack 0% 2.85% 88.89% 26.53%
Table 1: Model performance on regular test set, and under adversarial attack.
6 Discussions and Conclusions
From the results in Table.1, we note that SDR-Learnable is robust against one-step and iterative
white-box attacks. The decrease in classification accuracy between the FGSM and DeepFool attacks
8
is expected, as combating iterative attacks is a strictly harder task for adversarial defense[26]. Without
using the variance threshold schedule to train SDR-Learnable, the classification accuracy under
the DeepFool attack was 40.15%. This indicates that the use of the variance threshold technique
is crucial to defense against iterative white-box attacks. SDR-Learnable achieves an adversarial
accuracy of 88.89% against the iterative black-box attack LocalSearch. Without using the variance
scheduler, the accuracy against LocalSearch is 44.05%. This indicates that there is significant benefit
of using the variance scheduler to combat iterative black-box attacks.
While SDR-Learnable has been shown to be robust against adversarial attacks, it was not trained
using any adversarial examples. Existing work has shown that the use of adversarial examples
during training results in an adversarially robust network; the same technique can be leveraged
using SDR-Learnable networks to further improve their robustness. Several existing techniques
for adversarial defense can be incorporated into our network architecture, further improving model
robustness.
In the reported experiments, SDR-Learnable was used only in an MLP, but the technique can be
easily applied to almost any neural network architecture, resulting in at most twice the number of
original parameters (each parameter is replaced with a distribution parameterized by a mean and a
variance term). In our experiments, there was no significant difference in the time taken to train or
evaluate the SDR-Learnable network.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that non-determinism in the model parameters improves
robustness against white-box and black-box attacks. The SDR-Learnable technique can be adapted
using any network architecture, maintaining task-specific performance and providing defense against
one-step and iterative whitebox and blackbox attacks, at no significant additional parameter cost.
Furthermore, while iterative white-box attacks have been shown to compromise defense models
based on stochastic gradients, we have shown that explicitly increasing the parameter variances while
maintaining task-specific performance in SDR-Learnable significantly improves robustness.
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